This study provides a link between accounting, managerial discretion and monetary policy. Monetary authorities encourage banking institutions to supply credit to the economy. Increased bank supply of credit is a good thing but too much of a good can be a bad thing. This paper investigates under what circumstances excessive loan supply ceases to be a good thing and how bank managers react to this.
Introduction
This paper seeks to provide a link between managerial discretion, an accounting number (loan loss reserves) and monetary transmission mechanism. The paper begins with the well-known premise that monetary authorities supply money or credit to the economy through banking institutions. If banking institutions decline to supply credit or issue loan, then, these institutions may lose their legitimacy.
Therefore, banks will supply credit or loan. Motivations to increase bank credit supply may derive from the need to generate higher profit or due to policy requirements by central bankers. Managers are, particularly, concerned about excessive supply of bank credit because of its potential to communicate unintended signal to the stock market, particularly, investors. Therefore, managers can expect to take on certain actions to address this concern. Motivated by this concern, this study investigates one possible action that managers might take -credit smoothing. Particularly, I examine whether banks smooth credit over time and under what conditions they do this.
A second motivation for this study is to investigate bank-specific determinants of loan loss reserves, not provisions. Extant research has already investigated the determinants of provisions. However, there is a scant literature on determinants of loan loss reserves 1 . Therefore, this paper aims to fill this gap by examining bank-specific determinants of level of loan loss reserves. I note that banks in several countries have different accounting rules, different supervisory rules, different loan loss policies, and possibly different incentives that might affect provisioning and reserve behavior. To control for these differences, I examine country-specific reserve behaviour.
The findings in the study make some contribution to the existing literature. First, this study contributes to the banking literature by investigating bank-specific determinants of loan loss reserves by extending the provisioning literature to loan loss reserves. An approach unique to this paper is the inclusion of an important determinant, the size of bank loan portfolio rather than the total asset, a common proxy for bank size across mainstream studies 2 . The rational for this is because, intuitively, loan loss reserves should have a direct impact on bank loan portfolio not necessarily on total asset. 3 Third, this study contributes to the monetary economics literature by providing another explanation as to why actual monetary supply outcomes falls below expected outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 distinguishes between provisions and reserves. Second 3 review the existing literature. Section 4 discusses the data, sample selection and methodology. Section 5 discusses the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2
Literature Review
Provisions and reserves
An important distinction between loan loss provision (LLP) and loan loss reserve (LLR) is needed.
Provisions and reserves behave differently. Provisions are a deduction from gross interest income in the income statement while reserves are yearly accumulation of provisions in the balance sheet. Also, reserves behave like capital and are used to shield banks against unusual expected losses. According to Bikker and Metzemaker (2005) , LLP reflect managerial decision at a point in time (annual) while loan loss reserves is the accumulation of annual net provisions over time that reflects actual expected loan losses. Also, loan loss reserve is perceived to be linked directly to the quality of bank loan portfolio and is susceptible to short-term fluctuations arising from macroeconomic developments and the solvency of individual counterparties (Bikker and Metzemaker, 2005) . Bikker and Metmaker (2005) went on to investigate whether the same variables that explain provisioning behaviour also explains the behaviour of reserves. They found that the same explanatory variables that explain loan loss provision also explain the level of loan loss reserve but less significantly. However, they concluded that the level of reserve is likely to be influenced more significantly by outside shocks and insignificantly by managerial incentives such as capital management motives and income smoothing motives.
3 Another justification for using loan portfolio size, rather than total asset, is due to my observation that most studies do not find strong significant size effect on provisions and when they do, it is significant mostly at the 10% s.f level. (for example, Laeven and Majononi, 2003) . Therefore, provision/reserves tend to have a weak relation to bank size proxy by total asset.
Theory
The theoretical literature argue that credit risk represents an important driver of the riskiness of banks and that current period loan growth is likely to have an impact on current period provisions (e.g. Liu and Ryan, 2006) . In theory, a positive relation between credit risk and provisions is expected (e.g., Liu and Ryan, 2006; Foos et al. 2010) . Following this reasoning, incremental increase in loan should lead to incremental increase in reserves (e.g. Kanagaretnam et al, 2003) . Also, Laeven and Majnoni (2002) note that continuous increase in bank lending is generally associated with lower monitoring efforts and deterioration in loan quality, thus, necessitating increased provisions. Thus, a prudent bank is expected to report a positive relationship between the level of loan loss reserves and credit risk. A common measure for bank credit risk exposure in the literature is loan growth or change in outstanding loans (e.g. Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2002; Lobo and Yang, 2001) . Nonetheless, Lobo and Yang (2001) argue that, in reality, the relationship between loan growth and LLP is largely unpredictable due to uncertainty in the quality of incremental loans.
Determinants of LLR
Provisioning research identify three (3) bank-specific determinants of loan loss reserves: bank asset portfolio composition, credit risk and state of the business cycle. Many provisioning studies employed these variables as control variables when examining income smoothing practices while few studies employed these variables as bank-specific factors . In this study, I employ these variables as bankspecific factors.
Asset-portfolio risk is an indication of bank overall risk from the financial analyst perspective. It is a measure of how much loans banks have in relation to total asset. The use of loan to asset ratio as a proxy for overall risk exposure on bank portfolio is common across the literature (e.g. Sinkey and Greenawalt, 1991; Laeven and Majnoni, 200; Hasan and Wall, 2004; Floro, 2010) . Intuitively, portfolio risk should influence the level of reserves if bank asset portfolio contains more loans than securitized assets. This is because loan loss reserve tends to behave like capital used as a buffer against losses arising from excessive risk-taking. Thus, when portfolio risk is high, banks tend to increase LLR as a buffer to absorb losses in the portfolio. The higher the risk, the greater the need for more reserves. Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991) found a significant positive relationship between loanasset ratio and level of loan loss reserve. Hasan and Wall (2004) investigated the determinants of loan loss reserve and found that loan-asset ratio is significant and positively related to loan loss reserve for US banks and Japanese bank samples but negative and insignificant for Canadian banks. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) found a significant positive relationship between loan loss reserve and bank portfolio risk. Consistent with prior studies, I expect a positive relationship between reserves and bank portfolio. However, a significant negative relationship, if any, is likely to indicate a largely diversified bank portfolio.
Credit risk, proxy by loan growth, is also a determinant of the level of loan loss reserve. Lobo and Yang (2001) found a significant positive relationship between loan growth and provisions not reserves. Laeven and Majnoni (2002) found a weakly significant negative relationship between loan growth and provisions for Europe, Asia, US and Latin America. Kanagaretnam et al (2003) found a significant positive relationship between provisions and loan growth. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) found a significant positive relationship between loan loss reserves and loan growth for US banks but insignificant evidence for European banks. Bushman and Williams (2012) found a significant positive relationship between provisions and loan growth. Overall, I hypothesize a positive relationship between bank credit risk exposure (loan growth) and LLR.
Another determinant of the level of loan loss reserves is the state of the business cycle. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) found strong evidence of procyclical pattern in loan loss reserve during recessionary period for the full bank sample. However, this procyclical behaviour is significant for European banks but insignificant for US banks. Floro (2010) found a significant negative relationship between loan loss reserves and the business cycle for Philippine banks while Ozili (2015) found a negative relationship for Nigerian banks. A positive sign on GDP growth rate would suggest that LLR behaves like capital. That is, banks build up reserves during good times and use up reserves during bad times, thus, a positive relationship.
Hypothesis Development

LLR and Credit Supply Hypothesis
Monetary authorities tend to facilitate money supply to the economy through banking institutions. As bank loan portfolio increases, the supply of credit to the economy also increases, at least, in principle.
Therefore, the size of bank loan portfolio is an indicator of bank credit supply. If monetary authorities want expansionary credit supply and act as a guarantor against significant expected loan losses, banks may have some incentive to underestimate loan loss reserve to boost credit supply (gross loan) to the economy in line with monetary policy expectations. This describes the credit supply hypothesis.
Following this reasoning, I hypothesize that, if banks are concerned about meeting monetary policy expectations, a negative relationship between reserves and bank loan portfolio is expected.
H1:
A negative relationship between LLR and loan portfolio size is expected.
LLR and Credit Smoothing Hypothesis.
Monetary authorities expect banks to increase their supply of bank credit to boost consumption and investment in the economy. This expectation is usually intense to speed up recovery from recession.
Banks that significantly decrease the size of loan portfolio in bad times tend to attract regulatory attention. Therefore, in order to avoid attracting regulatory attention, banks tend to smooth the level of credit supply over time. There are two explanations for this.
First, bank managers are concerned that excessive supply of credit can have unintended signaling effect to the stock market (that is, investors might interpret excessive credit supply as a signal for excessive risk-taking which is generally associated low loan quality). Therefore, banks tend to strike a balance between supplying excessive credit to satisfy monetary authorities and the need to prevent unintended signaling effect to the stock market.
Second, increased supply of credit is a good thing to the economy but too much of a good thing can be a bad thing due to adverse selection. Therefore, banks attempt to avoid excessive loan supply by using accounting techniques to influence the size of gross loans.
Following both reasoning, there is a reason to believe that banks tend to smooth credit supply by overstating (understating) loan loss reserves when loan portfolio is expected to be unusually high (low) to minimize unintended signaling to investors and to avoid regulatory attention. This behaviour is described here as 'credit smoothing', hence, the credit smoothing hypothesis.
This hypothesis suggest that, if banks are strongly concerned about the signaling consequences of excessive credit supply, then, banks will use loan-decreasing smoothing strategies to reduce the unusually large size of gross loan during good times and use loan-increasing strategies, in bad times, to boost loan portfolio size when loan size is unusually low to avoid regulatory discipline. Therefore, I hypothesize that the need to avoid unintended signaling tends to motivate managers to smooth bank credit supply. Thus, a positive relationship between reserves and bank loan size would indicate evidence for credit smoothing. Therefore, the second hypothesis is:
H2: A significant positive relationship between LLR and loan portfolio size is expected.
Reserves Behaviour during a Crisis
The behaviour of loan loss reserve during a crisis might provide new information about bank managers' priority during the crisis -whether to smooth credit supply or to boost credit supply in line with the expectations of monetary expectations? During recessionary periods, I propose that banks may not necessarily increase the size of its loan portfolio due to credit risk concerns rather banks might understate reserves to boost net loans upwards to satisfy regulators and monetary authorities.
Therefore, I expect evidence for credit smoothing during a recession. This expectation is intuitive, particularly, when monetary authorities act as a guarantor against severe credit losses arising from complying with monetary authorities. A negative sign would suggest support the credit supply hypothesis.
H3: A positive relationship between LLR and bank loan portfolio size is expected.
On the other hand, it may be difficult to predict the behaviour of LLR because the managerial actions during a financial crisis are influenced by a combination of factors such as credit risk concerns, expectations of monetary authorities, stock market signaling, state of the business cycle and other country-specific considerations, etc.
Methodology
Data and Sample Selection
The data include banks' balance sheet information and country-specific macroeconomic indicators. to control for the consistency and quality of bank reporting. The resulting sample included 82 banks from 11 countries, with a total of 820 bank-year observations. The sample is divided into regions:
Europe, US, Asia and Africa.
Estimation Procedure
Panel data cross-section and time series regression with fixed effect is employed. This is consistent with Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) . I modify the equation to introduce the credit smoothing variable into the model containing other determinants of the level of reserves. I adopt three model specifications.
The first model specifies theoretical determinants of reserves and tests the two main hypotheses. The second model tests the crisis-reserve hypothesis. The third model tests for robustness by employing a more precise measure of credit risk rather than loan growth. Another robustness check examines country-specific regression to control for country-specific differences. The only weakness of bankcountry analysis is that it reduces the degree of freedom of bank-country observations. However, this approach is preferred in order to avoid the 'dummy variable trap' arising from using multiple dummy variables to control for multiple cross-country and institutional differences.
Therefore, the econometric specification is given as:
Model 1:
LLRi,t = NPLi,t+ LOTAi,t + LOANi,t + InGLi,t + GDPj + ɛi,t The key bank-specific determinants of interest in this analysis are LOAN, LOTA and INGL. To test the hypotheses, the key variable of interest is the InGL variable. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss reserves over gross loans. This is consistent with Bhat (2010) . Explanatory variables include bank-specific determinants (LOAN, NPL, LOTA, InGL) and country-specific determinants (GDP).
At bank level, I employ NPL to control for non-discretionary influences on reserves. This is consistent with prior studies, for example, Beaver and Engel (1996) . NPL, the ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loan is an ex post measure of loan portfolio quality and may contain information on bank risk not captured by traditional measures of risk. I exclude income smoothing and capital management variables from the model because Bikker and Metzemaker (2005) found that the level of reserve tend to have less significance with managerial incentives relative to provisions 5 Discussion of Results 
Descriptive Statistics and correlations
5.2
Discussion of result
Main Result
Regression 1 shows that most variables are consistent with prior expectations. After pooling the full bank sample, NPL, LOTA and INGL report significant coefficient signs. InGL variable reports a significant negative sign in support of the credit supply hypothesis indicating that banks reduce the level of reserves to boost the size of its loan portfolio either to earn high profit or to meet the credit supply expectations of monetary authorities. Unlike Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Hasan and Wall (2004) 's findings, the LOTA variable report a significant negative sign for the pooled sample.
The significant negative indicates that bank loan portfolio appears to be largely diversified. LOAN variable did not report any significant sign. This seem to suggest that the level of reserve is not influenced by current credit risk exposure Regression 2 reports regional results. NPL is significant across all regional bank samples. Also, InGL coefficient reports a significant positive sign for US banks (t=2.97). This supports the credit smoothing hypothesis. InGL reports a significant negative sign for Asian banks (t=-5.36). This supports the credit supply hypothesis. InGL is not significant across European and African bank samples. Also, LOTA reports a significant negative sign for Asian banks (t=-5.58), European banks (t=-1.89) and African banks (t=-3.28) but not for US banks. LOAN does not report any significant sign for regional bank samples. GDP reports a significant negative sign for US banks only. This indicates procyclical loan loss reserve behaviour. Conclusions.
In this study, I investigate (i) the determinants of loan loss reserves, and (ii) whether banks tend to smooth bank credit supply due to unintended signaling effects. I find that the level of loan loss reserve is influenced by bank-specific factors, particularly, loan to asset ratio and loan portfolio size, and insignificantly influenced by current credit risk consideration, loan growth. I conclude that this insignificant effect on reserves suggests that current credit risk tend to be reflected in provisions not necessarily in reserves.
Also, the findings in support of credit smoothing to minimize unintended signaling appears to be conflict with expectations of monetary authorities, particularly, when significant supply of credit is needed to boost the economy during a recession. Thus, managerial choice to smooth credit during a crisis further amplifies the existing recession. This is not to suggest that credit smoothing is unethical or inappropriate. Rather, I argue that, the appropriateness of credit smoothing tend to depend on the state of the economy when credit smoothing practices takes place. Finally, the extent of credit smoothing will depend on concerns about stock market signaling, the state of the business cycle, institutional and country specific factors and on whether investors view the level of reserve as a valuerelevant accounting number. 
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